Mind in Matter No.1:
The Void and The Mirror: Perception and Conditions of Self-knowledge
The interior and the exterior are inseparable. The world is entirely on the inside, and I am entirely outside of myself.
—Maurice Merleau-Ponty[1]
We habitually experience our thoughts and feelings as mental states occurring inside us, and self-knowledge can seem perfectly ordinary. Sometimes, those same thoughts and feelings manifest a different meaning through introspection than they did when we experienced them in real time. When they become memories that evoke emotions such as melancholy, we use language or image to formulate expressions through which we communicate them. Those expressions can appear to follow already constituted mental events. But if it is the same experience, why does it yield different understandings in situ and in retrospect? If an experience is already ours as we live through it, why is its meaning not always clear to us immediately? Can an encounter reveal something that introspection alone cannot?
If an encounter with something outside us can bring our thoughts and feelings into focus, then not all self-knowledge can be described as the retrieval of contents already articulated within. A subtle physical sensation may register as a minute muscular tension, reminding us of an old injury before attention registers the sensation of pain; an incident may not be presently available to recollection until something in the immediate surroundings unexpectedly brings it to mind. Random series of happenings and encounters can affect how we become the person we are today, while their significance may become apparent only later when we attempt to formulate them. For example, in writing or through an autobiographical project using pen or canvas. What remains uncertain is how much of the understanding that eventually emerges existed beforehand in the same determinate form.
This essay aims to show that self-knowledge develops when aspects of first-person experience not yet available to reflective understanding become intelligible through their relation to the physical situations in which they occur. What I propose does not deny interiority. Instead, an experience can be irreducibly first-person without being self-explanatory: the sensation is mine, while what it means may become clearer through an encounter in which it can be tested, differentiated, or revised.
Since the last series began with Marcel Duchamp talking in a roundtable meeting, for this one, I start with Yves Klein and his La spécialisation de la sensibilité à l’état matière première en sensibilité picturale stabilisée (The Specialization of Sensibility in the Raw Material State into Stabilized Pictorial Sensibility), 1958.[3] The work, subsequently known as Le Vide (The Void), may seem the antithesis of an argument about the relation between interior experience and material exteriority, if Yves Klein completed the work by removing “everything” from the exhibition space and leaving it “empty.” But the apparent contradiction is what makes this particular work fitting: it encapsulates a case for understanding that is not immediately available without the encounter. Think of it this way: Klein had removed the conventional material objects associated with conventional ideas of “art” entirely from view; yet his gesture of removal did not eliminate the material encounter. Rather, it relocated the encounter from a material object within the gallery to a heightened encounter with the physical space itself. In this context, space, the viewer’s bodily position, movement, emotional expectation, and perceptual uncertainty all consequently became operative rather than incidental.
Following Le Vide, the essay moves between art, philosophy, and other disciplines that have tried to describe the self from the inside and the outside. I examine Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, which grounds the argument in a subject already situated in the world; Dan Zahavi's account of pre-reflective self-consciousness, which explains how an experience is mine before I understand it; Ulric Neisser's work on self-narrative, from cognitive psychology, which separates the self who remembers from the self remembered; and Shaun Gallagher's Pattern Theory of Self (PTS), which provides a model for understanding how heterogeneous patterns of selfhood can nevertheless belong to a changing whole. Finally, the essay returns to art through contemplations of Roni Horn's Untitled (“The tiniest piece of mirror is always the whole mirror.”) (2022) and Water Double, v. 1 (2013), where perceptual constancy and environmental variation provide a material stress test of what it might mean for self-knowledge to persist while its conditions change. From there, Jacques Derrida’s distinction between finding and inventing turns the inquiry to whether an understanding that emerges through such encounters should be considered a discovery of what was already there or the invention of something new.
And maybe because I’m here and because the me in what’s here makes what’s here different, maybe that will be enough, maybe that will be what I’m after.
—Roni Horn[2]
La spécialisation de la sensibilité à l’état matière première en sensibilité picturale stabilisée or better known as Le vide at Galerie Iris Clert, Paris, 28 April – 12 May 1958. Courtesy Yves Klein, ADAGP, ParisOn 28 April 1958, in Galerie Iris Clert in Paris, Yves Klein opened La spécialisation de la sensibilité à l’état matière première en sensibilité picturale stabilisée (The Specialization of Sensibility in the Raw Material State into Stabilized Pictorial Sensibility). It subsequently became known as Le Vide (The Void). The exhibition occupied a compact gallery space of about twenty square meters. According to the artist’s own writing, after spending forty-eight hours alone painting the walls and the unused display case white with the binder he used for creating his Untitled blue monochrome (IKB), his “active presence during the execution in the gallery space will create the climate and the radiating pictorial environment … a sensuous density that is abstract yet real, existing and living, by itself and for itself.” [4] Because of this, he claimed that he had established a stabilized pictorial sensibility that visitors could experience and absorb instantly. For this occasion, Klein required two Republican Guards in formal presidential dress uniforms to give it an official flavor. In the corridor, he welcomed visitors with blue cocktails (gin, Cointreau, methylene blue). To enter, visitors had to pass a large blue tapestry that concealed the door.
From Klein’s own notes, 2,500 to 3,000 people crowded the street as the police and firemen arrived. Some visitors could not bring themselves to enter, while others stayed for hours in silence or wept. In the same writing, he continues, describing his visitors’ reactions: “for the most part, the crowd enters the gallery in anger and exits from it fully satisfied. … seized by the intense atmosphere that reigns, terrifyingly, in the apparent void of the exhibition space.”[5] The next day, Iris Clert was summoned by the Republican Guard and charged with an affront to the dignity of the Republic. Klein concluded that he had “overcome the problematics of art.”[6]
Perception as Encounter
Any less-familiar presentation of a work of art can cause an existing category or genre to seem insufficient by exposing an old persistent habit of looking. The experience of Le Vide reveals with particular clarity the relation between first-person experience and material encounter: the artwork exists physically outside the viewer while remaining capable of reorganizing interior thought processes before a full interpretation is reached. This work is an interesting case study for the present thesis because it demonstrates that the withdrawal of materially identifiable objects from a familiar physical environment does not make the reciprocal relation less perceptible.
It works like this: a sensation directs attention toward a form — Galerie Iris Clert exhibition space — and the form constrains and redirects perception because it’s stripped of its usual objects, yet it remains an exhibition space. The perceiver compares the new experience with memory, expectation, and prior knowledge. The resulting account can in turn alter what gets noticed next. In this way, the first-person experience and later self-knowledge are neither simply extracted from nor imposed by an external object. They develop through the adjustments made across this relation. Crucial conditions of the work are the physical gallery space and the viewer’s awareness that he is standing in Klein’s gallery exhibition. Instead of a familiar physical object, the physically situated space itself constitutes the artwork.
The perceiver compares the new experience with memory, expectation, and prior knowledge. The resulting account can in turn alter what gets noticed next.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception provides a way of understanding what it means for experience to occur from within a situation. The perceiving subject does not encounter the world from a position outside but is already bodily situated within the field it perceives. Relations of proximity, distance, foreground, and horizon arise within this situated perspective. Merleau-Ponty makes the relation between situatedness and subjectivity explicit: “If the subject is in a situation, or even if the subject is nothing other than a possibility of situations, this is because he only achieves his ipseity by actually being a body and by entering into the world through this body.”[7]
Situatedness therefore describes more than the external circumstances; the body is constitutive of the perspective from which anything can be encountered at all. This does not collapse interior experience into its physical conditions. It makes those conditions inseparable from how the world becomes perceptually available to a subject. Therefore, Merleau-Ponty’s paradoxical statement: “The interior and the exterior are inseparable. The world is entirely on the inside, and I am entirely outside of myself”[8] can also be read as saying that first-person experience remains mine, but the self does not exist independently of the world in which perceptions, movements, and actions are possible.
To be an embodied subject of experience does not necessarily mean having oneself as an object of that experience. How, then, does the subject figure in an experience before becoming an object of reflection? Dan Zahavi’s pre-reflective self-consciousness identifies a more basic form of self-consciousness that precedes reflective self-understanding. Pre-reflective self-consciousness does not involve a subject-object structure. It names the first-personal character intrinsic to experience without requiring the subject to take that experience as an object of scrutiny. In his theory, an experience does not first occur anonymously and then acquire its first-person character through reflection. Its givenness already differs from my observation of someone else’s experience. [9] In other words, the self is not another thing encountered within the experience. It is the subject of the experience, without which there would be no experience to speak of.
The Subject of Experience
The experience itself does not require an inner statement that it belongs to me, nor does its first-person character guarantee an accurate understanding of what is experienced.
Zahavi describes this elementary self-presence as experiential for-me-ness. The experience itself does not require an inner statement that it belongs to me, nor does its first-person character guarantee an accurate understanding of what is experienced. For example, I can feel tension without knowing precisely whether it belongs to fear, resentment, fatigue, or several conditions at once. The uncertainty about its meaning does not make the experience less first-person. The distinction is between the way an experience is given and the interpretation I make of it.[10] Let’s try it in a practical situation.
Imagine someone attending a gallery reception feeling intense muscle tension along with a strong wish to go away and never return. Just the night before, he had happily accepted the invitation and expected to have an enjoyable evening. Later unable to rest after the evening reception, he remembers a conversation during which his remark went unacknowledged. He first names this initial restlessness as social discomfiture, then anxiety, finally anger. Eventually he recognizes that what disturbed him was the moment when he felt he was being treated as though unimportant and invisible. This account does not establish that the cause of his dismay is objectively retrieved, nor does it mean that the emotion was arbitrarily manufactured by the evening.
Neisser’s account of autobiographical memory provides a useful distinction here. In “Self-narratives: True and False,” he separates the actual event, the event as experienced at the time, the subsequent act of remembering it, and the remembered event—the particular version established through recollection.[11] The event as experienced and the remembered event need not be congruent. To return to the gallery reception example: the bodily tension and wish to leave formed part of the experience as it unfolded, as did the attendee’s remark going unacknowledged. Anxiety, discomfiture, and anger enter his subsequent attempts to characterize that experience, culminating in the recognition that he had felt disregarded. The remembered event, then, need be neither the recovery of a meaning already articulated in the experience as lived, nor the invention of an experience that never occurred. It is a retrospective version of the event, organized through the act of remembering. In this version, aspects of the earlier experience may acquire a significance they did not have for the attendee at the time.
Neisser writes in a different paper that “the self is full of apparent contradictions.”[12] Shaun Gallagher’s Pattern Theory of Self (PTS) offers a conception of selfhood in which heterogeneous processes need not coincide perfectly within the organization of a self. PTS describes the self through processes that are bodily, prereflective experiential, affective, behavioral/action, social/intersubjective, cognitive/psychological, reflective, narrative, ecological, and normative entering into dynamic relations with one another.[13] Gallagher’s theory treats the self as a dynamic gestalt constituted by multiple processes. He writes: “within the self-pattern there is no element that operates as a controlling agent. …there is no self within a self-pattern. There is no single element that by itself could count as a self. A self, of the sort that you are and that I am, just is a pattern.”[14]
The remembered event, then, need be neither the recovery of a meaning already articulated in the experience as lived, nor the invention of an experience that never occurred.
Zahavi and Gallagher thus clarify different aspects of the problem of self-knowledge. Zahavi establishes that an experience is already given first-personally before it becomes an object of reflection. Gallagher situates that experiential dimension within a dynamic self-pattern. Taken together, they give a picture like this: the experiential for-me-ness establishes whose experience it is; the meaning an experience acquires in reflective self-knowledge can emerge through the continually readjusting relations among the ten processes Gallagher identifies, although not all of them need be present at any given time.
The result is that explicit self-description and present self-experience can diverge. A person may regard himself as comfortable in any social situation while finding actual participation increasingly difficult. My bodily response may signal to me that something is wrong, but it does not by itself reveal exactly what is wrong: fatigue, boredom, or misunderstanding may each be present, separately or in combination. But the tension gives me a reason to reconsider the account of my experience. Self-knowledge is formulated through relations among felt experience, memory, judgment, and the circumstances of an encounter, as the meaning of each is tested and revised in relation to the others.
The Conditions of Identity
If the self is a dynamic pattern, how does it retain continuity when the processes constituting it change their relations? Gallagher argues that we can address this question “by thinking about the concept of a self-pattern as being anchored in a unique living body (being constituted in part by some embodied aspects) and as being characterized by a relatively stable (but changeable) set of dynamical relations among all of its factors.”[15] The question of continuity can therefore be answered by considering how identity persists through relations that are themselves capable of transformation.
Roni Horn, Untitled (“The tiniest piece of mirror is always the whole mirror.”), 2022
Installation view, Centro Botín, Santander, Spain, 2023.
Photo: Stefan Altenburger; Courtesy the artist and
Hauser & WirthRoni Horn’s Untitled (“The tiniest piece of mirror is always the whole mirror.”)* (2022), a ten-part work in cast glass, offers an occasion for philosophical reflection on the theory of self through sculpture and installation. Each unit is made of solid cast glass, materially substantial and stable, and laid on the gallery floor like enlarged checker pieces in colors at the cool end of the spectrum. The appearance of the units alters with the viewer’s position and movement, and under different light conditions, producing varying reflections. No single reflection or impression identifies the entire piece; its variable visual manifestations all constitute the work itself. Defying the notion of sameness as resistant to change, Horn’s piece encourages viewers to consider how stable materiality can produce different appearances under changing external factors without ceasing to be the same work. The work’s title “The tiniest piece of mirror is always the whole mirror” introduces another relation between continuity and change: that of part and whole. It draws attention to the peculiar possibility that division need not deprive the fragment of its identity as part of the whole.
Obviously, to draw parallels between Horn’s work and Gallagher’s PTS risks compressing the two into an equivalence too quickly. This is not what I am suggesting. Gallagher’s theory of self concerns the identity of a human being, while Horn’s solid cast-glass piece lends poetic license to consider how material identity can remain recognizable amid perceptual variation. What the work makes palpable is the complexity concealed within the ordinary judgment of sameness: stability does not necessitate the absence of change. It is in this poetic treatment that Horn’s work meets Gallagher’s PTS.
Another cast-glass work that extends an inquiry into how what remains the same need not remain unchanged emphasizes the conditions under which we make judgment. In Water Double, v. 1 (2013), two industrial-size cast-glass cylindrical forms stand as a pair mirroring each other in size and shape, in two different colors that evoke shades of water and reflections when observed in different meteorological conditions. The work’s physical doubling creates a material situation that suggests an abstract metaphor conveying the idea: they are the same but different. The work is solid cast glass, but its surface is fire-polished giving the impression of looking into a pool of water. To take in the work, the viewer needs to move around the two forms, encountering each from different positions. Visually, the piece presents a paradox: large cylindrical forms that look solid and heavy from the side, but from the top they look like yielding surfaces of a water pool. What makes the Water Double a fitting resonance with PTS comes from the viewer’s recognition that material stability need not present itself uniformly. The contrast between the translucent but opaque sides and the highly reflective fire-polished tops is particularly evocative of the idea that a single object can be apprehended through variation. Its top can recall a mesmerizing water pool while the vertical surface of the work insists on a bounded volume — like a compression of something once permeable. Natural light through the windows, reflections, and the viewer’s angle determine whether attention rests on its surface or its height and volume.
Water Double, v. 1, 2013
Solid cast glass with as-cast surfaces with oculus
Height: 132.1 cm / 52 in Diameter: 134 – 142 cm / 53 – 56 in (tapered) each, two parts
Photo: Ron Amstutz; Courtesy the artist and Hauser & WirthBoth cast-glass pieces provide us with useful examples through which to understand Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account described earlier: a thing perceived is never given from nowhere, that perception occurs from within a bodily situation. As the viewer approaches Water Double, looks across its surface, moves around it, or turns from one toward the other, the work’s whole form becomes available through a succession of perspectives. This can be a useful test of the relation between certainty and intelligibility. A superficial question would be which appearance is truer. One can answer that each angle discloses an aspect of the same material object under different conditions. To describe the whole encounter, the viewer must account for those physical conditions beyond the work itself: where she stands, how the light falls, which surface she attends to, and what she remembers seeing a moment earlier. Thus, a judgment about the object becomes more precise when the viewer’s participation enters the account.
The doubling and grouping aspects of Water Double add a further dimension. Two similar forms invite a comparison that cannot be reduced to recognizing each separately. If attention shifts from one to the other, the impression of the first can persist in memory while the second is being seen. Comparison then unfolds across perception and memory, and returning to the first after seeing the second can modify it once again. An interval in time and space becomes an interval in perceptual experience. The comparison of the two parts can expose how the claim that two parts are the same depends on a remembered appearance whose detail is already selective.
The question then shifts from whether the two appearances are the same to how an experience is retained, recalled, and incorporated into an account of what was experienced. Neisser’s distinction between an event as experienced and an event as remembered becomes useful here without turning the sculpture into a model of autobiographical memory. While the second is being viewed, the appearance of the first is available only through memory, which does not necessarily preserve every feature of the first experience. What persists in memory is already partial. Likewise, Zahavi’s account of experiential for-me-ness helps distinguish the first-person character of the encounter from the reflective judgments subsequently made about it. The experience is mine as I move between the forms; what precisely I saw, how alike the forms appeared, or why an appearance changed remain open to reconsideration.
Discovery, invention, and intelligibility
If the relation between sensation and external form changes what becomes intelligible, is the resulting self-knowledge discovery or invention? Neither would be adequate without qualification. Discovery acknowledges the constraints of what happened: bodily responses, memories, and encounters are not infinitely available for redescription. Invention accounts for an organization of past experiences that may itself be new. Jacques Derrida, in “Coming, Inventing, Finding, Finding Oneself,” writes: “To find is to invent when the experience of finding takes place for the first time. An event without precedent whose novelty may be either that of the (invented) thing found …, or else the act and not the object of “finding” or discovering.”[16] Here, Derrida distinguishes between novelty belonging to the thing found and novelty belonging instead to the act of finding or discovering it. The insight can also help describe how self-knowledge can emerge from something that has already occurred without reducing the later understanding to the recovery of information already available at the time. The event may belong to the past while the act of recognizing its significance may occur only for the first time in a later reflection. The new understanding is answerable to first-person sensation and the external conditions through which it was clarified. As such, its emergence does not come from pure fabrication, but its coherence does not make it immune to revision either.
Self-knowledge is formulated through relations among felt experience, memory, judgment, and the circumstances of an encounter, as the meaning of each is tested and revised in relation to the others.
Certain forms of self-discovery require an inventive moment when finding an adequate form for an experience can change what the person is able to recognize. The experience of art offers a particularly apt setting for this emergence of self-discovery because it gives perceptible form to the relation between first-person experience and the material conditions encountered. In 1958, Yves Klein deranged established categories of painting by asking the viewer to absorb an energy emanating from within the physical space of Iris Clert’s Paris gallery, which he had deliberately prepared before opening the exhibition. Roni Horn’s cast-glass pieces offer a different phenomenological encounter, exposing how seeing is conditioned by the viewer’s position, movement, memory, and the changing circumstances in which an object appears. These works do not seek one universal response. They manifest materially different situations in which first-person sensation can be considered across an event as it unfolds and as it is subsequently remembered, making visible the gap between experience and its later recollection.
Questioning the accounts that initially seem to provide satisfactory answers can be one way of making experience more intelligible. A form of self-knowledge arises through nuanced distinctions among conditions that on the surface appear contradictory and through an examination of the relations between them. The conditions of self-knowledge include the physical forms, concepts, and practices through which experience can become distinguishable, revisable, and shareable. These do not deny or dismiss the first-person experience of living through something. They help explain how a first-person experience fits with a self-understanding that depends on what lies beyond immediate consciousness. The distance between having an experience and knowing what it means may never reach perfect resolution from introspection alone. It is within that distance that relations between the self and the world remain available for examination and revision. It is by allowing our first-person experience to be revised through material or cultural encounters that we remain curious about what may lie beyond our present understanding.
[1] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes (London: Routledge, 2012), 430.
[2] Roni Horn, Island Zombie: Iceland Writings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), 11.
[3] In Klaus Ottmann’s translation of Klein’s writings, this work is listed as “The Refinement of Sensibility in the First Material State into Stabilized Pictorial Sensibility.” See Yves Klein, Overcoming the Problematics of Art: The Writings of Yves Klein, trans. Klaus Ottmann (New York: Spring Publications, 2007), 48. The title I use here follows the exhibition catalogue: Kerry Brougher and Philippe Vergne, eds., Yves Klein: With the Void, Full Powers (Washington, DC: Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden; Minneapolis: Walker Art Center; New York: D.A.P./Distributed Art Publishers, 2010), 108.
[4] Klein, Overcoming the Problematics of Art, 51–53.
[5] Ibid., 55.
[6] Ibid., 56.
[7] Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 431.
[8] Ibid., 430.
[9] Dan Zahavi, Being We: Phenomenological Contributions to Social Ontology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025), 27–28.
[10] Ibid., 29–30.
[11] Ulric Neisser, “Self-narratives: True and False,” in The Remembering Self: Construction and Accuracy in the Self-Narrative, ed. Ulric Neisser and Robyn Fivush (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 2.
[12] Ulric Neisser, “Five Kinds of Self-Knowledge,” Philosophical Psychology 1, no. 1 (1988), quoted in Lambros Malafouris, People Are STRANGE: Material Engagement and the Creation of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2026), 112.
[13] Shaun Gallagher, The Self and Its Disorders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024), 19–22.
[14] Ibid., 16.
[15] Ibid., 17.
[16] Jacques Derrida, “Psyche: Invention of the Other,” trans. Catherine Porter, in Psyche: Inventions of the Other, vol. 1, ed. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 23.
*Horn’s title for this piece is a sentence from Clarice Lispector’s Água Viva.
Written by Chennie Huang